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On 12th April 2016 the Italian Parliament definitively 
passed an important constitutional reform, which is 
expected to radically change the Italian system of 
government. A referendum on it will very likely be held in 
October 2016. This reform is of great interest for anyone 
who observes the EU from a constitutional law 
perspective. First of all, the content of this reform has 
been affected by Italian membership of the EU. Secondly, 
the new Italian Senato that will emerge from this reform 
should play a specialised role in focusing on EU affairs, as 
happens in some other member states with a bicameral 
system. This Policy Brief discusses this role, considering it 
as valuable in light of the EU constitutional system set out 
by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
The content of the Italian constitutional reform  
 
The current Italian constitutional reform is expected to 
radically change the Italian system of government. Its main 
aim is superseding the Italian equal bicameralism, which is 
an exception among the EU member states and one of the 
causes of the inefficiencies in the way the Italian system of 
government currently works. Equal bicameralism means 
that both of the Italian Chambers, Camera dei deputati 
(Chamber of Deputies) and Senato della Repubblica 
(Senate of the Republic), have exactly the same 
legitimation and tasks. Regarding their legitimation, the 
Camera and the Senato are both elected by direct 
universal suffrage (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution) 
for five years (Article 60 Const.): each Member of 
Parliament, therefore, represents the Nation (Article 67 
Const.).  
 
Such an equal bicameralism seems to negate the idea of 
bicameralism itself, which should normally allow the voice 
of social and regional forces to be heard by the State and 
enrich political representation and pluralism. For example, 
in many federal states, the second Chamber represents 
the federated states (e.g. in Austria, Belgium, Germany). 
The same happens in a regional state like Spain, where the 
Senado (Senate) represents the Comunidades autónomas 
(Autonomous Communities), or in some unitary states 
(like France and the Netherlands), where the second 
Chamber represents the regional/local authorities. 
Another sensible model involves the members of the 
second Chamber representing functional interests, like in 
Ireland and in Slovenia, or being high-profile and ‘expert’ 
members, as in the United Kingdom. Apart from Italy, only 
in three EU member states (Czech Republic, Poland and 
Romania) the two Chambers are nowadays directly 
elected by the people. However, they do not exercise the 
same functions, as happens in Italy.  
 
Executive Summary 
> On 12th April 2016 the Italian Parliament 
definitively passed a constitutional reform, 
which supersedes the Italian equal bicameralism 
(i.e. same structure and functions for both the 
Chambers, Camera and Senato), which is one of 
the causes of the inefficiencies of the Italian 
system of government. A referendum on it will 
very likely be held in October 2016.  
> Italian membership of the EU has had an effect 
on the content of this reform: EU governance 
requires member states to deal efficiently with 
EU institutions. 
> With this reform, the Italian Senato should play a 
specialised role in EU affairs, as happens in some 
other member states with a bicameral system. 
Therefore, the reform can be considered as 
valuable in light of the EU constitutional system 
set out by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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The second feature of Italian bicameralism is that the tasks 
of the two Chambers are exactly the same. Legislative 
powers are exercised collectively by both Chambers and 
the government requires the confidence of both. The 
reason why, after World War II, the Italian Founding 
Fathers chose the solution of such an equal bicameralism, 
was the ‘complesso del tiranno’ (‘tyrant complex’). After 
the twenty-year experience of fascist dictatorship, this so-
called ‘tyrant complex’ saw the Constitutional Assembly 
introduce a bicameralism based on the power of veto of a 
second Chamber which would control (and in some way 
restrain) the action of the government and of the political 
majority who would win the first elections after the 
passing of the Constitution in 1948. It has to be borne in 
mind that the Italian Constitution was passed at the 
beginning of the Cold War: one big party, the Democrazia 
Cristiana, supported the United States, while the Marxist 
parties supported the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Therefore, the 1948 elections were to decide 
whether Italy would belong to the Western alliance or not: 
every party wanted to be sure, in case of losing the 
election, that the winner would not be too powerful. For 
this and other reasons (e.g. the proportional-
representation electoral system and the very fragmented 
multipartyism), the development of the Italian political 
system until the 1990s was unique among the Western 
countries, with very weak governments and the 
development of a consensus instead of a majoritarian 
democracy.  
 
Things have changed radically since the 1990s. The end of 
the Cold War, a majoritarian electoral system and the birth 
of new parties made alternate governments possible and 
the governments became more efficient within the Italian 
political system. However, the equal bicameralism is still 
putting a brake on the efforts of governments to carry out 
their political programs. 
 
This would change with the constitutional reform. First, 
the Senato would become an indirectly elected Chamber, 
representative of the Regioni (Regions), the Province 
autonome (Autonomous Provinces) and local authorities, 
while the Camera would continue to be directly elected by 
the people. Second, the government would not require 
the confidence of the Senato anymore but only of the 
Camera. The Camera would also have the general power 
of definitively approving legislative bills, which means that 
legislative powers would not be exercised collectively by 
the Camera and the Senato anymore, apart from some 
matters such as constitutional amendment bills.  
 
 
How Italian membership of the EU affected the reform 
 
Italy has been trying to supersede equal bicameralism for 
more than thirty-five years but every attempt to amend 
the Constitution for that purpose has failed. Now, on the 
contrary, it is very likely that the current constitutional 
amendment process will succeed. Why? Events in the EU 
and in Italy between 2010 and 2013 marked a set of 
turning points, with EU membership having a significant 
impact.  
 
In 2010, a yearly cycle of economic policy coordination 
between the EU’s member states and its institutions was 
established within the EU, called the ‘European Semester’. 
In 2011, most EU member states signed a Treaty (the so-
called ‘Fiscal Compact’) which prescribes a balanced 
budget rule to be incorporated in each member state’s 
legal system. What this new EU economic governance 
actually required was that within the new yearly cycle of 
economic EU policy coordination, every government 
should be able to deal quickly and efficiently with the EU 
institutions. Italian equal bicameralism, by contrast, 
traditionally results in a lengthy legislative process and 
puts a brake on the government and its efforts to carry out 
its political programme.  
 
Moreover, the economic and financial crisis, which 
overwhelmed Italy especially since 2011, showed – once 
again under the pressure of the EU – how stuck the Italian 
parliamentary system was. In July 2011, the government 
led by Silvio Berlusconi, which after the 2008 elections 
could rely on a large majority in Parliament, issued a wide-
reaching decreto-legge (emergency decree) with 
measures to face the economic and financial crisis. 
However, on 5th August 2011, the European Central Bank 
sent a confidential letter to the Italian government stating 
that those measures were not enough to tackle the crisis 
and asking it to establish structural reforms. The letter 
underlined that the Euro area Heads of State or 
Government summit of 21st July 2011 had concluded that 
“all euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible 
determination to honour fully their own individual 
sovereign signature and all their commitments to 
sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms”. After 
receiving the letter, the Italian government was able to 
pass a second decreto-legge in August 2011 with further 
measures to tackle the crisis only with the support of the 
opposition parties. However, it was not able to establish 
structural reforms. This led Berlusconi to resign in 
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A non-partisan government (not composed of politicians 
but experts in economics and legal issues) led by the 
economist Mario Monti was then appointed. It was 
supported in Parliament by the main centre-right-wing 
party, the main centre-left-wing party and by another 
centre party and obtained the vote of confidence by the 
broadest majority in the history of the Italian Republic. 
This demonstrated that the Italian system of government 
does not work efficiently: the only way it was able to get 
out of its stalemate and tackle the economic and financial 
crisis under the pressure of the EU was through such a 
non-partisan government.  
 
Almost the same happened after the 2013 elections when 
the centre-left-wing coalition obtained the majority in the 
Camera but not in the Senato. In any bicameral system 
there could be different majorities between the two 
Chambers. However, this obviously becomes a huge 
problem in a system with an equal bicameralism like the 
Italian one, where the government requires the 
confidence of both Chambers and legislative powers are 
exercised collectively by both of them. The Italian political 
system faced a new stalemate and the same parties which 
had supported Monti’s government gathered to support 
the so-called ‘broad agreement’ government led by Enrico 
Letta, which was politically weak and lasted for less than 
one year. After those events the main parties agreed that 
the necessity to reform equal bicameralism could not be 
put off any more.  
 
As the explanatory notes of the Constitutional 
Amendment Bill clearly state, Italy needs to carry out this 
reform “to fully rationalize the complex multi-level 
governance based on the European Union, the State and 
the Regioni” and, in wider terms, “to enhance the 
efficiency of the decision-making and public policies 
implementation processes (…) in order to achieve the 
stability of the Government activity and the speed and the 
strength of decisions which are essential in the global 
competitive context”.  
  
The potential future specific functions of the Senato 
regarding the EU 
 
The specific functions regarding the EU that the new 
Senato would exercise with this reform would be the 
following. As the exact meaning of the Articles is not 
always clear, efforts need to be made to interpret them 
(Albanesi 2015).  
 
(a) The Senato would contribute to exercising the 
functions of linking the State with the 
Regioni/Province autonome/local authorities and with 
the EU (Article 55, paragraph 5, of the new 
Constitution). This implies that the Camera could 
exercise such functions, too. However, the Senato 
being an indirectly elected Chamber which would 
represent the Regioni, the Province autonome and 
local authorities, it seems to be potentially fit for 
acting as a specialised Chamber on EU affairs in the 
context of the multilevel governance of the EU system.  
(b) The Senato would take part in decision-making and in 
the implementation of EU acts and policies (Article 55, 
paragraph 5, of the new Constitution). This seems to 
mean two things. At the EU level, the Senato could 
play a specialised role by issuing reasoned opinions on 
the compliance of EU legislative drafts with the 
principle of subsidiarity (in accordance with the 
‘yellow’ and ‘orange card’ procedure set out by Article 
7 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon) and by 
issuing opinions within the ‘political dialogue’ (which 
are without legal effect, in accordance with the so-
called ‘Barroso procedure’). At the national level, the 
Senato could play a specialised role in carrying out 
inquiries and hearings on EU affairs: the reports which 
would come from such activities could also be used by 
the Camera to hold the government to account or to 
adopt resolutions addressed to the government on its 
EU policies.  
(c) The Senato would assess the impact of EU policies on 
the Regions (Article 55, paragraph 5, of the new 
Constitution). This function seems to include in 
particular the scrutiny on the compliance of EU 
legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity.  
(d) The Senato and the Camera would exercise legislative 
powers collectively in relation to the bill which sets out 
the general rules, the terms and the conditions 
concerning the way Italy shall implement 
commitments which arise from EU membership 
(Article 70, paragraph 1, of the new Constitution) and 
the bills which authorise the ratification of 
international treaties concerning EU membership 
(Articles 80 and 87, paragraph 8, of the new 
Constitution). The extent of such legislative powers 
should be interpreted narrowly. This means excluding, 
from the collective exercise of legislative powers by 
the Chambers, bills that are aimed at implementing 
commitments which arise from EU membership. If 
not, the Senato would continue to play the same role 
that it is playing nowadays, as most legislation is 
enacted to implement commitments which arise from 
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At the end of the day, the Senato could act as a specialised 
Chamber on EU affairs, as happens in some other member 
states with a bicameral system (Hefftler et al. 2015), 
especially in the UK. In fact, in the UK the European Union 
Select Committee of the House of Lords is more selective 
and more thorough in scrutinizing EU drafts than the 
European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons: 
whereas the Commons Committee reports quickly on a 
large number of documents, often within a week, the 
Lords Committee reports on a much smaller number of 
documents in considerably greater detail in longer 
inquires. This led the former Italian Prime Minister and 
Vice-President of the Convention on the Future of Europe 
Giuliano Amato to say that “the best reports that we read 
throughout the Union, on whatever European documents, 
are coming from here [i.e. from the European Union Select 
Committee of the House of Lords]. You deserve 
appreciation and esteem from everybody, because the 
analysis is very detailed with arguments that it is difficult 
to find anywhere else” (House of Lords 2012).  
 
The new Senato in light of the EU constitutional system 
 
National Parliaments, being democratic bodies, have been 
playing an important role in the EU constitutional system 
especially since the Treaty of Lisbon by adopting 
resolutions to their national governments, holding the 
latter to account for their EU policies and connecting the 
EU institutions with the needs of the European people.  
Such a role has been played by the National Parliaments 
especially through reasoned opinions adopted according 
to Article 7 of Protocol No. 2 and through opinions given 
within the ‘political dialogue’. This demonstrates that 
“national parliaments are part of a greater constitutional 
whole than the microcosm of the national constitutional 
system” (Besselink 2007). 
 
In light of the EU constitutional system, the Italian 
constitutional reform can thus be considered as a valuable 
change. The Senato, being an indirectly elected Chamber 
which would represent the Regioni, the Province 
autonome and local authorities, should represent the 
needs of regional and local authorities and bring them to 
the attention of the State and, through the latter, to the 
EU. It should also take part in decision-making and in the 
implementation of EU acts and policies, in the way which 
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